aliens searching to upload their consciousness into humans

Hypothetical process of digitally emulating a encephalon

Mind uploading, also known as whole encephalon emulation (WBE), is the theoretical futuristic process of scanning a physical structure of the encephalon accurately plenty to create an emulation of the mental state (including long-term memory and "cocky") and transferring or copying information technology to a computer in a digital class. The figurer would then run a simulation of the brain'due south information processing, such that information technology would respond in essentially the same mode as the original encephalon and feel having a sentient conscious listen.^{[i] [two] [iii]}

Substantial mainstream enquiry in related areas is being conducted in animal brain mapping and simulation, development of faster supercomputers, virtual reality, brain–computer interfaces, connectomics, and information extraction from dynamically functioning brains.^[4] According to supporters, many of the tools and ideas needed to achieve heed uploading already exist or are currently nether active development; withal, they will admit that others are, as yet, very speculative, but say they are all the same in the realm of engineering science possibility.

Mind uploading may potentially be accomplished by either of ii methods: re-create-and-upload or copy-and-delete by gradual replacement of neurons (which can be considered as a gradual destructive uploading), until the original organic encephalon no longer exists and a computer program emulating the brain takes control over the body. In the instance of the quondam method, listen uploading would be achieved by scanning and mapping the salient features of a biological brain, and then by storing and copying, that information state into a computer organization or another computational device. The biological encephalon may not survive the copying process or may be deliberately destroyed during information technology in some variants of uploading. The simulated mind could be within a virtual reality or imitation world, supported by an anatomic 3D body simulation model. Alternatively, the simulated listen could reside in a computer inside (or either connected to or remotely controlled) a (non necessarily humanoid) robot or a biological or cybernetic body.^[v]

Amidst some futurists and within the part of transhumanist movement, listen uploading is treated as an important proposed life extension technology. Some believe mind uploading is humanity's current best selection for preserving the identity of the species, as opposed to cryonics. Another aim of mind uploading is to provide a permanent backup to our "mind-file", to enable interstellar infinite travel, and a means for human culture to survive a global disaster by making a functional re-create of a man gild in a computing device. Whole-brain emulation is discussed by some futurists as a "logical endpoint"^[five] of the topical computational neuroscience and neuroinformatics fields, both nearly brain simulation for medical inquiry purposes. Information technology is discussed in artificial intelligence research publications every bit an approach to stiff AI (bogus general intelligence) and to at least weak superintelligence. Another approach is seed AI, which wouldn't be based on existing brains. Calculator-based intelligence such as an upload could think much faster than a biological human fifty-fifty if it were no more intelligent. A large-scale society of uploads might, co-ordinate to futurists, give ascension to a technological singularity, meaning a sudden fourth dimension constant decrease in the exponential development of engineering.^{[half dozen]} Listen uploading is a fundamental conceptual feature of numerous scientific discipline fiction novels, films, and games.

Overview [edit]

The established neuroscientific consensus is that the human mind is largely an emergent property of the data processing of its neuronal network.^[7]

Neuroscientists have stated that important functions performed by the mind, such as learning, retentivity, and consciousness, are due to purely physical and electrochemical processes in the brain and are governed by applicable laws. For example, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi wrote in IEEE Spectrum:

Consciousness is part of the natural world. Information technology depends, we believe, merely on mathematics and logic and on the imperfectly known laws of physics, chemistry, and biology; it does not ascend from some magical or otherworldly quality.^[viii]

The concept of mind uploading is based on this mechanistic view of the heed, and denies the vitalist view of human life and consciousness.^[9]

Eminent computer scientists and neuroscientists have predicted that advanced computers will exist capable of thought and even accomplish consciousness, including Koch and Tononi,^[eight] Douglas Hofstadter,^[10] Jeff Hawkins,^[x] Marvin Minsky,^[eleven] Randal A. Koene, and Rodolfo Llinás.^[12]

Many theorists have presented models of the brain and take established a range of estimates of the amount of computing ability needed for partial and complete simulations.^{[5] [ citation needed ]} Using these models, some have estimated that uploading may become possible within decades if trends such as Moore'southward law keep.^[13]

Theoretical benefits and applications [edit]

"Immortality" or backup [edit]

In theory, if the information and processes of the mind tin can be disassociated from the biological body, they are no longer tied to the individual limits and lifespan of that body. Furthermore, information within a brain could be partly or wholly copied or transferred to i or more other substrates (including digital storage or another brain), thereby – from a purely mechanistic perspective – reducing or eliminating "mortality take chances" of such information. This general proposal was discussed in 1971 past biogerontologist George One thousand. Martin of the Academy of Washington.^[14]

Space exploration [edit]

An "uploaded astronaut" could be used instead of a "live" astronaut in human spaceflight, avoiding the perils of zero gravity, the vacuum of space, and catholic radiation to the human body. It would allow for the use of smaller spacecraft, such as the proposed StarChip, and information technology would enable virtually unlimited interstellar travel distances.^[15]

Relevant technologies and techniques [edit]

The focus of mind uploading, in the instance of copy-and-transfer, is on data acquisition, rather than data maintenance of the encephalon. A set of approaches known as loosely coupled off-loading (LCOL) may be used in the attempt to characterize and re-create the mental contents of a brain.^[16] The LCOL approach may take advantage of self-reports, life-logs and video recordings that can be analyzed by artificial intelligence. A lesser-up approach may focus on the specific resolution and morphology of neurons, the fasten times of neurons, the times at which neurons produce action potential responses.

Computational complexity [edit]

Estimates of how much processing ability is needed to emulate a human brain at various levels, along with the fastest and slowest supercomputers from TOP500 and a $one thousand PC. Note the logarithmic calibration. The (exponential) tendency line for the fastest supercomputer reflects a doubling every 14 months. Kurzweil believes that mind uploading will be possible at neural simulation, while the Sandberg & Bostrom written report is less certain most where consciousness arises.^[17]

Advocates of mind uploading point to Moore'south police to support the notion that the necessary computing power is expected to become available within a few decades. However, the actual computational requirements for running an uploaded human mind are very difficult to quantify, potentially rendering such an statement specious.

Regardless of the techniques used to capture or recreate the part of a human heed, the processing demands are probable to be immense, due to the large number of neurons in the human brain along with the considerable complexity of each neuron.

In 2004, Henry Markram, lead researcher of the Blue Brain Project, stated that "it is not [their] goal to build an intelligent neural network", based solely on the computational demands such a project would take.^[eighteen]

It will be very difficult because, in the encephalon, every molecule is a powerful estimator and we would demand to simulate the structure and function of trillions upon trillions of molecules besides as all the rules that govern how they interact. Y'all would literally need computers that are trillions of times bigger and faster than anything existing today.^[19]

V years later, later successful simulation of part of a rat brain, Markram was much more than bold and optimistic. In 2009, as director of the Bluish Brain Project, he claimed that "A detailed, functional artificial human brain tin can be congenital within the next 10 years".^[20] Less than two years into information technology, the projection was recognised to be mismanaged and its claims overblown, and Markram was asked to footstep down.^{[21] [22]}

Required computational chapters strongly depend on the chosen level of simulation model calibration:^[5]

Estimates from Sandberg, Bostrom, 2008

Level	CPU demand (FLOPS)	Memory demand (Tb)	$i million super‐figurer (Primeval year of making)
Analog network population model	xxv	tentwo	2008
Spiking neural network	x18	104	2019
Electrophysiology	ten22	10iv	2033
Metabolome	1025	106	2044
Proteome	ten26	107	2048
States of protein complexes	1027	108	2052
Distribution of complexes	10xxx	109	2063
Stochastic behavior of single molecules	1043	x14	2111

Scanning and mapping scale of an individual [edit]

When modelling and simulating the encephalon of a specific private, a encephalon map or connectivity database showing the connections between the neurons must be extracted from an anatomic model of the brain. For whole brain simulation, this network map should testify the connectivity of the whole nervous system, including the spinal cord, sensory receptors, and musculus cells. Destructive scanning of a small sample of tissue from a mouse brain including synaptic details is possible every bit of 2010.^[23]

However, if short-term retention and working retention include prolonged or repeated firing of neurons, too every bit intra-neural dynamic processes, the electrical and chemical signal state of the synapses and neurons may be hard to extract. The uploaded mind may then perceive a memory loss of the events and mental processes immediately earlier the time of brain scanning.^[five]

A full brain map has been estimated to occupy less than 2 x x¹⁶ bytes (20,000 TB) and would store the addresses of the connected neurons, the synapse type and the synapse "weight" for each of the brains' 10¹⁵ synapses.^{[5] [ failed verification ]} However, the biological complexities of truthful encephalon function (e.thousand. the epigenetic states of neurons, protein components with multiple functional states, etc.) may preclude an authentic prediction of the volume of binary data required to faithfully represent a performance human mind.

Series sectioning [edit]

Serial sectioning of a brain

A possible method for listen uploading is serial sectioning, in which the encephalon tissue and perhaps other parts of the nervous system are frozen and so scanned and analyzed layer past layer, which for frozen samples at nano-scale requires a cryo-ultramicrotome, thus capturing the construction of the neurons and their interconnections.^[24] The exposed surface of frozen nerve tissue would exist scanned and recorded, and then the surface layer of tissue removed. While this would be a very irksome and labor-intensive process, research is currently underway to automate the collection and microscopy of series sections.^[25] The scans would then be analyzed, and a model of the neural net recreated in the system that the heed was beingness uploaded into.

At that place are uncertainties with this approach using current microscopy techniques. If it is possible to replicate neuron function from its visible structure lonely, then the resolution afforded by a scanning electron microscope would suffice for such a technique.^[25] Yet, as the function of brain tissue is partially determined by molecular events (particularly at synapses, merely also at other places on the neuron's cell membrane), this may not suffice for capturing and simulating neuron functions. It may be possible to extend the techniques of serial sectioning and to capture the internal molecular makeup of neurons, through the use of sophisticated immunohistochemistry staining methods that could then be read via confocal light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation scanning microscopy. Even so, equally the physiological genesis of 'mind' is not currently known, this method may not be able to access all of the necessary biochemical information to recreate a human brain with sufficient fidelity.

Brain imaging [edit]

Process from MRI acquisition to whole brain structural network^[26]

It may be possible to create functional 3D maps of the encephalon activity, using advanced neuroimaging technology, such as functional MRI (fMRI, for mapping alter in blood flow), magnetoencephalography (MEG, for mapping of electric currents), or combinations of multiple methods, to build a detailed 3-dimensional model of the encephalon using non-invasive and non-destructive methods. Today, fMRI is often combined with MEG for creating functional maps of homo cortex during more than complex cognitive tasks, every bit the methods complement each other. Even though current imaging applied science lacks the spatial resolution needed to gather the information needed for such a scan, important recent and future developments are predicted to substantially better both spatial and temporal resolutions of existing technologies.^[27]

Brain simulation [edit]

At that place is ongoing work in the field of brain simulation, including fractional and whole simulations of some animals. For example, the C. elegans roundworm, Drosophila fruit fly, and mouse have all been imitation to diverse degrees.^{[ citation needed ]}

The Blue Encephalon Project by the Brain and Mind Institute of the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland is an attempt to create a synthetic encephalon by contrary-applied science mammalian brain circuitry.

Issues [edit]

Practical issues [edit]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (June 2020)

Kenneth D. Miller, a professor of neuroscience at Columbia and a co-manager of the Center for Theoretical Neuroscience, raised doubts about the practicality of mind uploading. His major argument is that reconstructing neurons and their connections is in itself a formidable chore, just it is far from being sufficient. Functioning of the brain depends on the dynamics of electrical and biochemical signal exchange between neurons; therefore, capturing them in a unmarried "frozen" state may prove insufficient. In addition, the nature of these signals may require modeling down to the molecular level and beyond. Therefore, while not rejecting the idea in principle, Miller believes that the complication of the "absolute" duplication of an individual mind is insurmountable for the nearest hundreds of years.^[28]

Philosophical issues [edit]

Underlying the concept of "mind uploading" (more than accurately "heed transferring") is the broad philosophy that consciousness lies within the encephalon's information processing and is in essence an emergent characteristic that arises from large neural network high-level patterns of organization, and that the same patterns of organization can be realized in other processing devices. Mind uploading also relies on the idea that the human mind (the "self" and the long-term memory), just like not-human minds, is represented by the current neural network paths and the weights of the brain synapses rather than by a dualistic and mystic soul and spirit. The mind or "soul" can be defined as the data country of the encephalon, and is immaterial only in the same sense equally the information content of a data file or the state of a computer software currently residing in the work-space memory of the figurer. Data specifying the information state of the neural network can be captured and copied as a "computer file" from the brain and re-implemented into a different physical form.^[29] This is not to deny that minds are richly adapted to their substrates.^[30] An analogy to the idea of heed uploading is to re-create the temporary information land (the variable values) of a computer plan from the computer memory to another computer and proceed its execution. The other computer may perhaps have different hardware architecture simply emulates the hardware of the first figurer.

These bug take a long history. In 1775, Thomas Reid wrote:^[31] "I would be glad to know... whether when my brain has lost its original structure, and when some hundred years later on the aforementioned materials are fabricated so curiously equally to become an intelligent being, whether, I say that existence will be me; or, if, two or three such beings should be formed out of my brain; whether they will all be me, and consequently one and the same intelligent beingness."

A considerable portion of transhumanists and singularitarians place great promise into the belief that they may get immortal, by creating one or many not-biological functional copies of their brains, thereby leaving their "biological vanquish". Yet, the philosopher and transhumanist Susan Schneider claims that at best, uploading would create a copy of the original person'due south mind.^[32] Schneider agrees that consciousness has a computational basis, just this does not mean nosotros can upload and survive. Co-ordinate to her views, "uploading" would probably result in the decease of the original person's brain, while but exterior observers tin can maintain the illusion of the original person withal existence alive. For it is implausible to think that one's consciousness would leave one'due south brain and travel to a remote location; ordinary physical objects do not behave this way. Ordinary objects (rocks, tables, etc.) are non simultaneously hither, and elsewhere. At best, a re-create of the original mind is created.^[32] Neural correlates of consciousness, a sub-co-operative of neuroscience, states that consciousness may be idea of every bit a land-dependent property of some undefined complex, adaptive, and highly interconnected biological system.^[33]

Others have argued against such conclusions. For example, Buddhist transhumanist James Hughes has pointed out that this consideration only goes so far: if i believes the self is an illusion, worries about survival are not reasons to avoid uploading,^[34] and Keith Wiley has presented an argument wherein all resulting minds of an uploading procedure are granted equal primacy in their claim to the original identity, such that survival of the cocky is adamant retroactively from a strictly subjective position.^{[35] [36]} Some have too asserted that consciousness is a part of an extra-biological organisation that is however to be discovered; therefore information technology cannot exist fully understood under the present constraints of neurobiology. Without the transference of consciousness, true heed-upload or perpetual immortality cannot be practically accomplished.^[37]

Some other potential consequence of mind uploading is that the decision to "upload" may so create a mindless symbol manipulator instead of a conscious listen (run into philosophical zombie).^{[38] [39]} Are nosotros to assume that an upload is conscious if it displays behaviors that are highly indicative of consciousness? Are we to presume that an upload is conscious if it verbally insists that information technology is conscious?^[40] Could there be an accented upper limit in processing speed above which consciousness cannot be sustained? The mystery of consciousness precludes a definitive reply to this question.^[41] Numerous scientists, including Kurzweil, strongly believe that the reply every bit to whether a separate entity is conscious (with 100% conviction) is fundamentally unknowable, since consciousness is inherently subjective (see solipsism). Regardless, some scientists strongly believe consciousness is the outcome of computational processes which are substrate-neutral. On the opposite, numerous scientists believe consciousness may be the consequence of some form of quantum computation dependent on substrate (run into quantum mind).^{[42] [43] [44]}

In light of uncertainty on whether to regard uploads equally conscious, Sandberg proposes a cautious arroyo:^[45]

Principle of assuming the well-nigh (PAM): Assume that any emulated system could have the same mental properties as the original system and treat information technology correspondingly.

Upstanding and legal implications [edit]

The process of developing emulation applied science raises upstanding issues related to animal welfare and artificial consciousness.^[45] The neuroscience required to develop brain emulation would require animal experimentation, first on invertebrates and so on small mammals before moving on to humans. Sometimes the animals would simply demand to exist euthanized in guild to extract, piece, and browse their brains, but sometimes behavioral and in vivo measures would exist required, which might cause pain to living animals.^[45]

In addition, the resulting animate being emulations themselves might suffer, depending on i's views about consciousness.^[45] Bancroft argues for the plausibility of consciousness in brain simulations on the footing of the "fading qualia" thought experiment of David Chalmers. He then concludes:^[46] "If, equally I contend above, a sufficiently detailed computational simulation of the brain is potentially operationally equivalent to an organic brain, it follows that nosotros must consider extending protections against suffering to simulations."

It might assistance reduce emulation suffering to develop virtual equivalents of anaesthesia, too equally to omit processing related to pain and/or consciousness. However, some experiments might require a fully functioning and suffering animal emulation. Animals might also suffer past accident due to flaws and lack of insight into what parts of their brains are suffering.^[45] Questions also arise regarding the moral condition of fractional brain emulations, equally well every bit creating neuromorphic emulations that draw inspiration from biological brains but are built somewhat differently.^[46]

Encephalon emulations could be erased past computer viruses or malware, without need to destroy the underlying hardware. This may make bump-off easier than for physical humans. The attacker might accept the calculating power for its own employ.^[47]

Many questions ascend regarding the legal personhood of emulations.^[48] Would they be given the rights of biological humans? If a person makes an emulated copy of themselves and then dies, does the emulation inherit their property and official positions? Could the emulation enquire to "pull the plug" when its biological version was terminally sick or in a coma? Would it aid to treat emulations every bit adolescents for a few years so that the biological creator would maintain temporary control? Would criminal emulations receive the death penalty, or would they be given forced data modification as a form of "rehabilitation"? Could an upload accept wedlock and child-care rights?^[48]

If simulated minds would come truthful and if they were assigned rights of their own, it may be hard to ensure the protection of "digital human rights". For example, social scientific discipline researchers might be tempted to secretly expose false minds, or whole isolated societies of simulated minds, to controlled experiments in which many copies of the same minds are exposed (serially or simultaneously) to different test conditions.^{[ citation needed ]}

Political and economic implications [edit]

Emulations could create a number of atmospheric condition that might increase risk of state of war, including inequality, changes of power dynamics, a possible technological artillery race to build emulations beginning, get-go-strike advantages, strong loyalty and willingness to "dice" amidst emulations, and triggers for racist, xenophobic, and religious prejudice.^[47] If emulations run much faster than humans, in that location might not be enough fourth dimension for human being leaders to make wise decisions or negotiate. It is possible that humans would react violently confronting growing ability of emulations, especially if they depress man wages. Emulations may not trust each other, and even well-intentioned defensive measures might be interpreted as offense.^[47]

Emulation timelines and AI risk [edit]

There are very few viable technologies that humans have refrained from developing. The neuroscience and reckoner-hardware technologies that may make brain emulation possible are widely desired for other reasons, and logically their development will continue into the hereafter. Bold that emulation engineering science volition make it, a question becomes whether we should accelerate or slow its advance.^[47]

Arguments for speeding upwardly brain-emulation research:

• If neuroscience is the bottleneck on brain emulation rather than computing ability, emulation advances may be more erratic and unpredictable based on when new scientific discoveries happen.^{[47] [49] [50]} Limited computing power would mean the starting time emulations would run slower and and then would be easier to adapt to, and in that location would exist more fourth dimension for the technology to transition through lodge.^[l]
• Improvements in manufacturing, 3D printing, and nanotechnology may accelerate hardware product,^[47] which could increment the "computing overhang"^[51] from excess hardware relative to neuroscience.
• If i AI-development grouping had a pb in emulation technology, it would take more subjective fourth dimension to win an arms race to build the offset superhuman AI. Because it would be less rushed, information technology would take more freedom to consider AI risks.^{[52] [53]}

Arguments for slowing downwardly encephalon-emulation enquiry:

• Greater investment in encephalon emulation and associated cognitive science might enhance the ability of artificial intelligence (AI) researchers to create "neuromorphic" (brain-inspired) algorithms, such as neural networks, reinforcement learning, and hierarchical perception. This could accelerate risks from uncontrolled AI.^{[47] [53]} Participants at a 2011 AI workshop estimated an 85% probability that neuromorphic AI would arrive earlier brain emulation. This was based on the idea that brain emulation would require agreement some brain components, and it would be easier to tinker with these than to reconstruct the entire brain in its original course. Past a very narrow margin, the participants on balance leaned toward the view that accelerating brain emulation would increase expected AI hazard.^[52]
• Waiting might give society more time to think near the consequences of encephalon emulation and develop institutions to improve cooperation.^{[47] [53]}

Emulation enquiry would also speed upwardly neuroscience as a whole, which might advance medical advances, cognitive enhancement, lie detectors, and capability for psychological manipulation.^[53]

Emulations might be easier to control than de novo AI considering

1. Human abilities, behavioral tendencies, and vulnerabilities are more thoroughly understood, thus control measures might be more than intuitive and easier to plan for.^{[52] [53]}
2. Emulations could more than easily inherit human motivations.^[53]
3. Emulations are harder to manipulate than de novo AI, because brains are messy and complicated; this could reduce risks of their rapid takeoff.^{[47] [53]} Also, emulations may exist bulkier and require more hardware than AI, which would also slow the speed of a transition.^[53] Different AI, an emulation wouldn't be able to apace expand beyond the size of a human brain.^[53] Emulations running at digital speeds would have less intelligence differential vis-à-vis AI and and then might more easily control AI.^[53]

As counterpoint to these considerations, Bostrom notes some downsides:

1. Fifty-fifty if we better understand human behavior, the evolution of emulation beliefs under self-comeback might be much less anticipated than the evolution of safe de novo AI under self-improvement.^[53]
2. Emulations may non inherit all human being motivations. Perhaps they would inherit our darker motivations or would behave abnormally in the unfamiliar surroundings of cyberspace.^[53]
3. Even if there'southward a slow takeoff toward emulations, there would still be a second transition to de novo AI after on. Two intelligence explosions may mean more total take a chance.^[53]

Because of the postulated difficulties that a whole brain emulation-generated superintelligence would pose for the control problem, computer scientist Stuart J. Russell in his book Human Compatible rejects creating ane, simply calling it "and then plainly a bad thought".^[54]

Advocates [edit]

Ray Kurzweil, director of engineering at Google, has long predicted that people will be able to "upload" their entire brains to computers and become "digitally immortal" by 2045. Kurzweil made this claim for many years, e.one thousand. during his speech communication in 2013 at the Global Futures 2045 International Congress in New York, which claims to subscribe to a similar set of beliefs.^[55] Listen uploading has also been advocated by a number of researchers in neuroscience and bogus intelligence, such every bit the late Marvin Minsky.^{[ citation needed ]} In 1993, Joe Strout created a pocket-sized web site called the Mind Uploading Home Page, and began advocating the idea in cryonics circles and elsewhere on the net. That site has non been actively updated in recent years, but information technology has spawned other sites including MindUploading.org, run by Randal A. Koene, who too moderates a mailing list on the topic. These advocates see heed uploading as a medical procedure which could eventually save endless lives.

Many transhumanists look forwards to the development and deployment of listen uploading technology, with transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom predicting that information technology will become possible within the 21st century due to technological trends such as Moore's constabulary.^[5]

Michio Kaku, in collaboration with Science, hosted a documentary, Sci Fi Scientific discipline: Physics of the Incommunicable, based on his book Physics of the Impossible. Episode four, titled "How to Teleport", mentions that mind uploading via techniques such as quantum entanglement and whole brain emulation using an advanced MRI motorcar may enable people to be transported vast distances at about light-speed.

The book Across Humanity: CyberEvolution and Futurity Minds by Gregory South. Paul & Earl D. Cox, is nearly the eventual (and, to the authors, almost inevitable) evolution of computers into sentient beings, but also deals with human mind transfer. Richard Doyle'southward Wetwares: Experiments in PostVital Living deals extensively with uploading from the perspective of distributed embodiment, arguing for example that humans are currently part of the "bogus life phenotype". Doyle's vision reverses the polarity on uploading, with artificial life forms such as uploads actively seeking out biological apotheosis every bit part of their reproductive strategy.

Run into as well [edit]

• Mind uploading in fiction
• Encephalon Initiative
• Brain transplant
• Brain-reading
• Cyborg
• Cylon (reimagining)
• Democratic transhumanism
• Human Encephalon Projection
• Isolated encephalon
• Neuralink
• Posthumanization
• Robotoid
• Send of Theseus—thought experiment asking if objects having all parts replaced fundamentally remain the same object
• Simulation hypothesis
• Simulism
• Technologically enabled telepathy
• Turing test
• The Hereafter of Work and Decease
• Chinese room

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading

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